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Abstract
We study facility location problems where agents control multiple locations and when reporting their
locations can choose to hide some locations (hiding), report some locations more than once (replication)
and lie about their locations (manipulation). We fully characterize all facility location mechanisms that
are anonymous, efficient, and strategyproof with respect to the richer strategic behavior for this setting.
We also provide a characterization with respect to manipulation only. This is the first, to the best of our
knowledge, characterization result for the strategyproof facility location mechanisms where each agent
controls multiple locations.
1 Introduction
In a classic facility location problem, a social planner chooses to build a facility based on reported locations
of agents on a real line. Each agent has one private location and prefers the facility to be built as close to her
location as possible. Agents may choose to lie about their locations to influence where the facility is built.
It is well-known that choosing the median of reported locations is not only strategyproof but also socially
optimal, resulting in the smallest total distance between the facility and agents’ locations. Moulin [1980]’s
seminal work fully characterizes all strategyproof facility location mechanisms for this setting.
In many scenarios, for example when each agent represents a community, agents may control more than
one locations. The social planner still hopes to select a location to build the facility based on agents’ reported
locations. The facility location problem where each agent controls multiple locations was first introduced
by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [2009]. Choosing the social optimal solution, the median of all reported
locations, is no longer strategyproof. Procaccia and Tennenholtz [2009] provided an intuitive, strategyproof
mechanism that relabels each reported location by the corresponding agent’s most preferred location and
then chooses the median of the relabelled locations. The characterization of all strategyproof mechanisms
remains an open question.
Moreover, strategyproof mechanisms so far only guard against one type of strategic behavior, that is
agents may lie about their locations in reporting (which we call manipulation in this paper). But when
agents control more than one locations, they can choose to hide some locations (hiding) or report some
locations more than once (replication) to influence the facility location to their benefit. Strategyproof mech-
anisms need to be robust against these richer strategic actions. The above-mentionedmechanism provided by
Procaccia and Tennenholtz [2009] is not strategyproof w.r.t. replication. Hossain et al. provided examples
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showing that facility location mechanismswhere each agent controlsmultiple locations may be strategyproof
w.r.t. manipulation but not hiding, or vice versa.
In this paper, we fully characterize strategyproof mechanisms w.r.t. the richer strategic actions for fa-
cility location problems where each agent controls multiple locations. Intuitively, for each agent reporting
multiple locations, one may treat her as an agent controlling a single location, her most preferred location,
which is the median of her reported locations. By doing so, all the strategyproof mechanisms for single
location agents should also be strategyproof for multiple location settings. One natural guess is that these
are all strategyproof mechanisms we desired. This is however not true. We show that there exists other strat-
egyproof mechanisms that depend on not only agents’ most preferred locations but also their other reported
locations.
To fully characterize all strategyproof facility location mechanisms where each agent controls multiple
locations, we first show that if one cannot distinguish which locations are reported by the same agent, referred
as settings with non-identifying locations, all strategyproof mechanisms outputs a constant location that is
independent of the reported locations. Then for settings with identifying locations, we show a necessary
property for any strategyproof mechanism: for each agent, the mechanism has at most two possible outputs
fixing other agents’ reports and the agent’s most preferred location(s). Further adding the Pareto efficiency
condition, we derive a full characterization for strategyproof mechanisms. Finally, we compare the result
with the characterization for strategyproof mechanisms w.r.t. manipulation only, and discuss the group
strategyproofness of the mechanisms.
1.1 Related Work
Dekel et al. [2010] investigated the framework of mechanism design problems in general learning-theoretic
settings. The facility location problem where each agent controls multiple locations is its special case for
one-dimensional linear regression, and was first introduced by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [2009]. Some
deterministic and randomize mechanisms are provided by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [2009], as well as
Lu et al. [2009], and they focused on the approximation ratio of these mechanisms, i.e. the total distance
between the facility and all agents’ locations compared with the optimal solution. Hossain et al. extended
these studies for considering another strategic behavior, hiding, and provided a strategyproof mechanism
w.r.t. both manipulation and hiding. On the other hand, Conitzer [2008]; Todo et al. [2011] studied the
strategyproofness w.r.t. false-name report, i.e. agents are able to create multiple anonymous identifiers. It is
similar to our replication when the identifier of the agent reporting each locations is unknown.
The facility location problems is also a framework for studying “single-peak” preference. As agents with
such kind of preference are commonly seen in political decision making like voting [Moulin, 1980], location
on networks [Schummer and Vohra, 2002], and resource allocation [Guo and Conitzer, 2010]. An extension
for the preference structure is the “single-plateau” preference, where the most preferred locations of agents
become intervals. Moulin [1984]; Berga [1998] provided corresponding characterizations of strategyproof
mechanisms for more general social choice settings. Following them, the characterizations were extended to
high dimensional Euclidean space [Border and Jordan, 1983; Barbera` et al., 1993, 1998] and convex spaces
[Tang et al., 2018]. These works considered manipulation as the only strategic behavior, and agents are
assumed to only report their “peak” or “plateau” preferences. In comparison, our work focuses on facility
location settings where agents have “single-plateau” preferences and richer actions spaces.
2
2 Our Model
Following a brief explanation of notations, we introduce the facility location problem where each agent
controls multiple locations, our richer strategic considerations, and desired properties of mechanisms for
this problem.
Notations. Let [k]
△
= {1, . . . , k} be the set of first k natural numbers. Given k real numbers t1, . . . , tk ∈
R∪{−∞,+∞} and t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tk, letmed(t1, . . . , tk) be their median. When k is odd,med(t1, . . . , tk) =
t(k+1)/2, and when k is even,med(t1, . . . , tk) = [tk/2, tk/2+1], which is a number if tk/2 = tk/2+1 and an
interval otherwise. Given a set S of real numbers, possibly with some identical elements, |S| denotes the
size of S, andmed(S) is the median of all numbers in S.
Facility Location Problems. There is a set of agents, [n]. Each agent i ∈ [n] controls a set of locations,
D¯i = {y¯i,j}j∈[|D¯i|], y¯i,j ∈ R, on the real line. Each agent i ∈ [n] is asked to report her set of locations to
the principal. Let Di = {yi,j}j∈[|Di|] denote agent i’s set of reported locations,with yi,j ∈ R. Di can differ
from D¯i in both size and values. We use D = {Di}i∈[n] to denote the set of locations reported by all agents
and N =
∑
i∈[n] |Di| to represent the total number of reported locations. The principal seeks a mechanism
pi : RN → R such that pi(D) is a proper location for building a facility that will be used by all agents. Each
agent incurs a loss
l(pi(D), D¯i) =
∑
y¯i,j∈D¯i
|pi(D)− y¯i,j | (1)
for using a facility located at pi(D). This loss function means that an agent’s loss is minimized when the
facility locates within an interval (the median of the agent’s locations) and strictly increases as the facility
moves away from the interval on either side. The following proposition formalizes this property.
Proposition 2.1. Loss function (1) represents “single-plateau” preferences. Let [y0i , y
1
i ] = med(D¯i), where
y0i ≤ y
1
i , represent the median interval of agent i’s locations. Then
• ∀y ∈ [y0i , y
1
i ], l(y, D¯i) = miny′∈R l(y
′, D¯i),
• ∀s1, s2 ∈ R satisfying s1 < s2 < y0i , l(s1, D¯i) > l(s2, D¯i) > l(y
0
i , D¯i), and
• ∀h1, h2 ∈ R satisfying h1 > h2 > y1i , l(h1, D¯i) > l(h2, D¯i) > l(y
1
i , D¯i).
Strategic considerations. Agents want to reportDi to minimize their loss. We allow three types of agent
strategic behavior:
• Manipulation. Each agent i ∈ [n] may report different value for each of her controlled locations.
This is the strategic behavior usually considered in the literature.
• Replication. Each agent i may report one or more of her locations for more than once. Note that
even if an agent reports her controlled locations without replication, it is possible that some locations
appear for more than once.
• Hiding. Each agent i may choose to no report some of her controlled locations.
The combination of these three types of strategic behavior allows agents to report a set of locations with any
size and any value.
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Desirable properties of mechanisms. The principle hopes to find a mechanism pi that discourages strate-
gic behavior of agents. We define three notions of strategyproofness that we’ll consider. The notions of
strategyproofness are with respect to one or more of the three types of strategic behavior.
Definition 2.1. A mechanism pi(D) is strategyproof w.r.t. some set of strategic behavior if no agent can
achieve less loss by deviating from truthfully reporting to a strategic action in the set, regardless of the
reports of the other agents.
Definition 2.2. A mechanism pi(D) is group strategyproof w.r.t. a set of strategic behavior if no coalition of
agents can simultaneously adopt strategic actions in the set such that every agent in the coalition is strictly
better off, regardless of the reports of the other agents.
Definition 2.3. A mechanism pi(D) is strong group strategyproof w.r.t. a set of strategic behavior if no
coalition of agents can simultaneously adopt strategic actions in the set such that no agent in the coalition
is strictly worse off and some agent in the coalition is strictly better off, regardless of the reports of the other
agents.
Note that a group strategyproof mechanism must be strategyproof and a strong group strategyproof
mechanism must be group strategyproof, but not vice versa. We will discuss the corresponding difference in
Section 5.
In addition to strategyproofness, two other properties are also desirable for facility location mechanisms.
Definition 2.4. A facility location mechanism pi(D) is anonymous if its output is symmetric w.r.t. all agents.
Definition 2.5. A facility location mechanism pi(D) is efficient if its output is Pareto optimal to all agents,
i.e. there does not exist another location that is strictly better for at least one agent and not worse for all
other agents.
When each agent only controls a single location, denoted by yi for i ∈ [n], Moulin [1980] characterizes
that all facility location mechanisms that are anonymous and strategyproof w.r.t. manipulation are of the
form
pi(D) = med(y1, . . . , yn, α1, . . . , αn+1), ∀y (2)
where α1, . . . , αn+1 ∈ R∪{−∞,+∞} are constants; all facility location mechanisms that are anonymous,
efficient, and strategyproof w.r.t. manipulation take the form
pi(D) = med(y1, . . . , yn, α1, . . . , αn−1), ∀y (3)
where α1, . . . , αn−1 ∈ R ∪ {−∞,+∞} are constants.
3 Strategyproof Facility Location Mechanisms for Non-identifying
Locations
We first show that when each agent can control multiple locations, being able to identify which locations are
reported by the same agent is necessary for developing non-trivial strategyproof mechanisms. We use the
term non-identifying locations to represent the case when one cannot tell which agent reports which location,
or more formally, for any reported location yji ∈ D, one cannot distinguish the agent i who has reported
the location. We show below that with non-identifying locations, all strategyproof mechanisms must be the
trivial constant mechanisms.
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Theorem 3.1. For facility location problems where each agent controls multiple locations, if the reported
locations are non-identifying, then any mechanism that is strategyproof w.r.t. manipulation must output a
constant location.
Proof. For convenience, denote the reported data set D as {yj}j∈[N ]. Since the reported locations are non-
identifying, it is possible that |Di| = 1 for each i. Then according to Moulin [1980], any strategyproof
mechanism has the form
pi(D) = med(y1, . . . , yN , α1, . . . , αN+1), ∀y.
We next prove that α1 = · · · = αN+1 = α for some α ∈ R ∪ {−∞,+∞}, which means the mechanism
always returns a constant α. Suppose otherwise, w.l.o.g, let α1 < α2 ≤ α3 · · · ≤ αN+1. Then we can
construct an example where an agent could achieve smaller loss through manipulation. Consider D¯1 =
{y1 = α1} and D¯2 = {y2, . . . , yN} as the real locations controlled by agent 1 and 2 respectively, where
yN = α2 and yj = (α1 +α2)/2 for j = 2, . . . , N − 1. Then truthfully reporting results in pi(D¯1, D¯2) = α2
and agent 2 suffers a loss of (N − 2)(α2−α1)/2. If agent 2 misreports his locations by manipulating yN to
y′N = (α1 +α2)/2, then the mechanism will output (α1 +α2)/2 and her loss becomes (α2−α1)/2, which
is strictly smaller if N > 3.
Corollary 3.1. For facility location problems where each agent controls multiple locations, if the reported
locations are non-identifying, then any mechanism which is strategyproof w.r.t. manipulation, replication,
and hiding, must output a constant location.
Thus, in the rest of the paper, we focus on facility location problems with identifying locations. We note
that identifying locations do not conflict with anonymity. Anonymity means that a mechanism’s outcome
is not affected by relabelling of the agents, while identifying locations only require that one knows which
locations are reported by the same agent and the labels of the agents are not important.
4 Strategyproof Facility Location Mechanisms for Identifying Loca-
tions
In this section, we characterize mechanisms that are anonymous, efficient and strategyproof w.r.t. all three
types of strategic behavior. We show that these mechanisms take the form of Moulin’s characterization (3)
where the median of each agent’s reported locations is used as the representative location for the agent. We
further show in Section 4.1 that the family of anonymous, efficient and strategyproof mechanisms remain
the same even if only manipulation is considered, when agents control the same number of locations.
We develop our results by first characterizing mechanisms that are anonymous and strategyproof w.r.t.
all three types of strategic behavior. Lemma 4.1 shows that from agent i’s perspective, fixing other agents’
reports, any anonymous and strategyproof mechanism can have at most two different outputs if the median
of the agent’s reported locations, [y0i , y
1
i ] = med(Di), is unchanged.
Lemma 4.1. For facility location problems where each agent controls multiple locations, if a mechanism
pi is anonymous and strategyproof w.r.t. manipulation, replication, and hiding, then from any agent i’s
perspective, for any y0i ≤ y
1
i ∈ R and allDi with [y
0
i , y
1
i ] = med(Di), the output of the mechanism is either
pi(D) ∈ [y0i , y
1
i ] or
pi(Di, D−i) =


si if l(si, Di) < l(hi, Di);
hi if l(si, Di) > l(hi, Di);
si or hi otherwise
(4)
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for some si, hi ∈ R that satisfies either si < y0i ≤ y
1
i < hi or si = hi. The values of si and hi depend on
the reports of other agentsD−i as well as y
0
i and y
1
i .
Proof. If a mechanism outputs the optimal location based an agent’s reported locations or a constant loca-
tion, the agent has no incentive to misreport. Thus, we try to characterize strategyproof mechanisms beyond
these two trivial types.
For each i ∈ [n] and D−i fixed, let [y0i , y
1
i ] = med(Di) be the interval that any location inside is
optimal for agent i’s real controlled locations. Through manipulation, replication and hiding, agent i is able
to misreport any possible location sets. Currently we focus on a special group of misreports, that is agent
i does not change the median value (either one or two value) of her controlled locations but may misreport
any others, i.e. all D′i with [y
0
i , y
1
i ] = med(D
′
i).
Suppose there are at least three different outputs pi({D′i, D−i}) for all suchD
′
i which do not belong to the
interval [y0i , y
1
i ], w.l.o.g. let pi({D
1
i , D−i}) < pi({D
2
i , D−i}) < pi({D
3
i , D−i}), pi({D
j
i , D−i}) /∈ [y
0
i , y
1
i ]
for j = 1, 2, 3. If y1i < pi({D
2
i , D−i}), then when other agents report D−i, agent i with real controlled
locations D¯i = D
3
i will misreport D
2
i to obtain a smaller loss. Otherwise, y
0
i > pi({D
2
i , D−i}), then when
other agents report D−i, agent i with real controlled locations D¯i = D
1
i will misreport D
2
i to obtain a
smaller loss. This is a contradiction, which means there are at most two different outputs for all such D′i
which do not belong to the interval [y0i , y
1
i ], denoted by si ≤ hi. Furthermore, if there exists some D
4
i
such that pi({D4i , D−i}) ∈ [y
0
i , y
1
i ], then for all D
′
i, pi({D
′
i, D−i}) ∈ [y
0
i , y
1
i ]. This means for all Di, either
pi(Di, D−i) ∈ [y0i , y
1
i ] or pi(Di, D−i) ∈ {si, hi}.
We further consider the case that si 6= hi. Let pi({D1i , D−i}) = si and pi({D
2
i , D−i}) = hi. If y
1
i < si,
then when other agents report D−i, agent i with real controlled locations D¯i = D
2
i will misreport D
1
i to
obtain smaller loss. Similarly, if y0i > hi, then when other agents report D−i, agent i with real controlled
locations D¯i = D
1
i will misreportD
2
i to obtain smaller loss. Thus, we know si < y
0
i ≤ y
1
i < hi, and Eqn.
(4) is straightforward.
The following example shows that a strategyproof mechanism indeed can have two different outputs, i.e.
satisfying Eqn. (4) for si 6= hi.
Example 4.1. For simplicity, suppose med(Di) is a unique number for each i ∈ [n]. For given constants
t1 < t2 ∈ R, let P = |{i|i ∈ [n], l(t1, Di) ≤ l(t2, Di)}| be the number of agents who prefer t1 to t2, and
Q = |{i|i ∈ [n], l(t1, Di) > l(t2, Di)}| be the number of agents who prefer t2 to t1. Then the following
mechanism is strategyproof:
pi(Di, D−i) =


t∗ if t∗ > t2 or t
∗ < t1;
t1 if t1 < t
∗ < t2 and P ≥ Q;
t2 if t1 < t
∗ < t2 and P < Q;
(5)
where t∗ = med(med(D1), . . . ,med(Dn), α1, . . . , αn+1).
Notice that the mechanism in this example is not efficient. We formally prove this observation in the
next lemma.
Lemma 4.2. For facility location problems where each agent controls multiple locations, if a mechanism pi
is anonymous, efficient and strategyproof w.r.t. manipulation, replication, and hiding, then for any i ∈ [n],
D−i, y
0
i ≤ y
1
i ∈ R, there do not exist si, hi ∈ R such that si < y
0
i ≤ y
1
i < hi, and pi satisfies Eqn. (4) for
allDi with [y
0
i , y
1
i ] = med(Di).
The proof of Lemma 4.2 makes use of Lemma 4.3.
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Lemma 4.3. For facility location problems where each agent controls multiple locations, suppose a mech-
anism pi is anonymous, efficient and strategyproof w.r.t. manipulation, replication, and hiding. If there exist
some i ∈ [n], D−i, y0i ≤ y
1
i ∈ R, si, hi ∈ R such that si < y
0
i ≤ y
1
i < hi, and pi satisfies Eqn. (4) for all
Di with [y
0
i , y
1
i ] = med(Di), denote two index sets I1 = {j|[y
0
j , y
1
j ] = med(Dj), y
0
j ≤ si, y
1
j < hi} and
I2 = {j|[y0j , y
1
j ] = med(Dj), y
1
j ≥ hi, y
0
j > si}, then I1 = ∅, I2 = ∅.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. If n = 1, an efficient mechanism should always output the median of the reported
locations, which means I1 = I2 = ∅ by definition.
For n = 2, w.o.l.g., assume there exists some D2 with med(D2) = [y
0
2 , y
1
2], y
0
1 , y
1
1 , and s1 < y
0
1 ≤
y11 < h1, such that pi satisfies Eqn. (4) for all D1 with [y
0
1 , y
1
1] = med(D1). This means there exist at least
two special location sets D11 and D
2
1 such that pi(D
1
1 , D2) = s1 and pi(D
2
1 , D2) = h1 (for example D
1
1 =
{s1, y01 , y
1
1, y
1
1} and D
2
1 = {y
0
1, y
0
1 , y
1
1 , h1}). If I1 6= ∅, that is y
0
2 ≤ si and y
1
2 < hi, then pi(D
2
1 , D2) = h1
is not efficient since any location between y01 and y
1
1 is a better output for both agent 1 and 2. If I2 6= ∅,
that is y12 ≥ hi and y
0
2 > si, then pi(D
1
1 , D2) = s1 is not efficient since any location between y
0
1 and y
1
1 is a
better output for both agent 1 and 2. Thus, the result holds for n = 2.
For n ≥ 3, assume there exist some i, D−i, y0i ≤ y
1
i , and si < y
0
i ≤ y
1
i < hi, such that pi satisfies Eqn.
(4) for allDi with [y
0
i , y
1
i ] = med(Di). Consider two special location setsD
1
i , D
2
i satisfying pi(D
1
i , D−i) =
si, pi(D
2
i , D−i) = hi. In the following proof, we shall derive contradictions for |I1| = 1, . . . , n − 1 by
induction, and the corresponding analysis for I2 is similar.
Step 1: Suppose |I1| = 1.
This means there is only one j ∈ [n], such that [y0j , y
1
j ] = med(Dj), y
0
j ≤ si and y
1
j < hi. Denote
D−i,−j as the reported location sets by agents other than agent i and j, then we rewrite the fact that
pi(D1i , Dj, D−i,−j) = si and pi(D
2
i , Dj , D−i,−j) = hi.
Step 1.1: MovingDj inside [si, hi] doesn’t change hi.
Consider agent j’s another possible reportD′j = D
1
i . Due to the efficiency, we know pi(D
1
i , D
′
j, D−i,−j) >
si ≥ y0j . If pi(D
2
i , D
′
j, D−i,−j) > hi, then when agent i reports D
2
i and other agents report D−i,−j , agent
j with real locations D¯j = D
′
j will misreportDj to obtain a smaller loss. If pi(D
2
i , D
′
j , D−i,−j) < hi, then
when agent i reportsD2i and other agents reportD−i,−j , agent j with real locations D¯j = Dj will misreport
D′j to obtain a smaller loss. This means pi(D
2
i , D
′
j, D−i,−j) = hi.
Step 1.2: hi is the only possible output.
Now for fixed D′j , D−i,−j , suppose there exists s
′
i < y
0
i such that for some D
′
i with [y
0
i , y
1
i ] = med(D
′
i),
pi(D′i, D
′
j , D−i,−j) = s
′
i. Let s
∗ = mink∈[n]{y
0
k|[y
0
k, y
1
k] = med(Dk), si < y
0
k ≤ y
1
k < hi}, and k denote
the corresponding agent with y0k = s
∗. Due to the efficiency we must have s′i ≥ s
∗ , which means there
exists k 6= i satisfying y0k ≤ s
′
i, y
1
k < hi. This means we can repeat Step 1.1 w.r.t. Dk and new [s
′
i, hi]
(for at most n − 2 times since k 6= i and k 6= j) until no such k. We reuse the notation D′−i after this
process (either with the repeated part or not) as the reports of agents other than i, and we have for all Di
with [y0i , y
1
i ] = med(Di), pi(Di, D
′
−i) = hi.
Step 1.3: There exists a beneficial misreport.
Here we prove for the case that the repeated process in Step 1.2 does not happen. (For the case that it does,
we only need to replace j andD1i by the lass k andD
′
i in the process.) Precisely, pi(D
1
i , D
′
j, D−i,−j) = hi.
However, when agent j reportsD′j and other agents reportD−i,−j , agent i with real locations D¯i = D
1
i will
misreportDj , which leads to pi(Dj , D
′
j , D−i,−j) = pi(Dj , D
1
i , D−i,−j) = pi(D
1
i , Dj, D−i,−j) = si by the
anonymity, to obtain a smaller loss. This is a contradiction, meaning it is impossible that |I| = 1.
7
Step 2. Suppose we have proved it is impossible that |I| = 1, . . . , t for some t ≥ 1, we consider the case
|I| = t+ 1.
Let jˆ = argminj∈I1{y
0
j |[y
0
j , y
1
j ] = med(Dj)}. Similarly, denote D−i,−jˆ as the reported location sets by
agents other than agent i and jˆ, and we rewrite the fact that pi(D1i , Djˆ , D−i,−jˆ) = si and pi(D
2
i , Djˆ , D−i,−jˆ) =
hi.
Step 2.1: MovingDjˆ inside [si, hi] doesn’t change hi.
Consider agent jˆ’s another possible report D′
jˆ
= D1i . If pi(D
1
i , D
′
jˆ
, D−i,−j) < y
0
jˆ
, it is not efficient since
at least y0
jˆ
is a better output for all agents j ∈ I1 as well as agent i and not worse for other agents. If
pi(D2i , D
′
jˆ
, D−i,−jˆ) > hi, then when agent i reports D
2
i and other agents report D−i,−jˆ , agent j with real
locations D¯jˆ = D′
jˆ
will misreportDjˆ to obtain a smaller loss. If y
0
jˆ
≤ pi(D2i , D
′
jˆ
, D−i,−jˆ) < hi, then when
agent i reportsD2i and other agents reportD−i,−jˆ , agent jˆ with real locations D¯jˆ = Djˆ will misreportD
′
jˆ
to obtain a smaller loss. This means pi(D2i , D
′
jˆ
, D−i,−jˆ) = hi.
Step 2.2: There must be another possible output s′i < y
0
i .
Now for fixedD′
jˆ
, D−i,−jˆ , if for all Di with [y
0
i , y
1
i ] = med(Di), pi(Di, D
′
jˆ
, D−i,−jˆ) = hi, specifically we
have pi(D1i , D
′
jˆ
, D−i,−jˆ) = hi. Then when agent jˆ reportsD
′
jˆ
and other agents reportD−i,−jˆ , agent i with
real locations D¯i = D
1
i will misreport Djˆ , which leads to pi(Djˆ , D
′
jˆ
, D−i,−jˆ) = pi(Djˆ , D
1
i , D−i,−jˆ) = si
by anonymity, to obtain a smaller loss. This is a contradiction, meaning there must exist s′i < y
0
i such that
for someD′i with [y
0
i , y
1
i ] = med(D
′
i), pi(D
′
i, D
′
jˆ
, D−i,−jˆ) = s
′
i.
Step 2.3: jˆ /∈ I ′1.
Now for D′
jˆ
, D−i,−jˆ , there still exist s
′
i, h
′
i, such that s
′
i < y
0
i ≤ y
1
i < h
′
i = hi and pi satisfies Eqn. (4)
for all Di satisfying that |Di| is an even number and [y0i , y
1
i ] = med(Di). And for the corresponding new
index set I ′1 = {j|[y
0
j , y
1
j ] = med(Dj), y
0
j ≤ s
′
i, y
1
j < hi} (after replacingDjˆ byD
′
jˆ
), we have jˆ /∈ I ′1 since
med(D′
jˆ
) = [y0i , y
1
i ].
Step 2.4: Repeating previous steps leads to |I ′1| = t.
Finally, if |I ′1| > t, we can repeatedly replace the report of the agent whose location set has the leftmost
median among those agents in I ′1 in the same way until |I
′
1| ≤ t, and the same analysis still holds. Since
such an index set satisfies |I ′1| ≤ n − 1, after at most n − t − 1 times of such replacing, we must have
|I ′1| = t. However, we have already proved that it is impossible for |I1| = t. By induction, we provide
contradictions for |I| = 1, . . . , n− 1, and this completes the proof of n ≥ 3.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Assume there exist some i, D−i, y
0
i ≤ y
1
i , and si < y
0
i ≤ y
1
i < hi, such that pi
satisfies Eqn. (4) for all Di with [y
0
i , y
1
i ] = med(Di). According to Lemma 4.3, we know for any j ∈ [n],
let [y0j , y
1
j ] = med(Dj), either y
0
j ≤ si < hi ≤ y
1
j , or si < y
0
j ≤ y
1
j < hi. Let I = {j|[y
0
j , y
1
j ] =
med(Dj), si < y
0
j ≤ y
1
j < hi}, I 6= ∅ since i ∈ I. Let s
∗ = minj∈I{y0j |[y
0
j , y
1
j ] = med(Dj)}. Then for
anyDi satisfying pi(Di, D−i) = si, it is not efficient since s
∗ is a better output for all agent j ∈ I while not
worse for other agent. This is a contradiction to the efficiency condition.
Lemma 4.2 indicates that any mechanism pi that is anonymous, efficient, and strategyproof, must only
depend on the optimal location for each agent. In other words, agents only need to report their most preferred
locations, i.e. med(Di) for i ∈ [n]. With Moulin [1980]’s results, we have the complete characterization.
Theorem 4.1. For facility location problems where each agent controls multiple locations, a mechanism pi
is anonymous, efficient and strategyproof w.r.t. manipulation, replication, and hiding, if and only if there
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exist α1, . . . , αn−1 ∈ R ∪ {−∞,+∞}, β ∈ [0, 1], for ∀D1, . . . , Dn,
pi(D1, . . . , Dn) = med(y
∗
1 , . . . , y
∗
n, α1, . . . , αn−1) (6)
where y∗i = βy
0
i + (1− β)y
1
i with [y
0
i , y
1
i ] = med(Di), for i = 1, . . . , n.
Notice that ifmed(Di) is an interval for some agent i, any value in the interval can be regarded as agent
i’s optimal location. For simplicity, we only include a tie-breaking rule based on an arbitrary constant β,
which is independent of (α1, . . . , αn−1) and guarantees the strategyproofness. Moulin [1984] providedmore
general characterizations for strategyproof social choice mechanisms where each agent reports an interval
as her “single-plateau” preference, which deal with the tie-breaking rules carefully.
4.1 Strategyproofness w.r.t. Manipulation Only
In most previous studies on facility location problems where each agent controls multiple locations, ma-
nipulation is considered as the only strategic behavior that agents may take. Although some strategyproof
mechanisms w.r.t. manipulation are discussed, there is no characterization result. To characterize such
strategyproofness, we further assume that each agent control the same number of locations.
Theorem 4.2. For facility location problems where each agent controls same number of multiple locations,
a mechanism pi is anonymous, efficient and strategyproof w.r.t. manipulation, if and only if there exist
α1, . . . , αn−1 ∈ R ∪ {−∞,+∞}, β ∈ [0, 1], for ∀D1, . . . , Dn,
pi(D1, . . . , Dn) = med(y
∗
1 , . . . , y
∗
n, α1, . . . , αn−1)
where y∗i = βy
0
i + (1− β)y
1
i with [y
0
i , y
1
i ] = med(Di), for i = 1, . . . , n.
The proof of Theorem 4.2 follows in a similar spirit as that of Theorem 4.1, which can be found in
Appendix A. Lemma 4.1 still holds but the proof of Lemma 4.2 needs modification because we cannot
directly apply Lemma 4.3.
5 Group Strategyproof Facility Location Mechanisms for Identifying
Locations
If a mechanism is group strategyproof w.r.t. some set of strategic behavior, then it must be strategyproof
w.r.t. the set of strategic behaviors. This means facility location mechanisms which are anonymous, efficient
and group strategyproof should satisfy Eqn. (6). We can further show that these strategyproof mechanisms
are indeed group strategyproof.
Theorem 5.1. For facility location problems where each agent controls multiple locations, a mechanism pi
is anonymous, efficient and group strategyproof w.r.t. manipulation, replication, and hiding, if and only if
there exist α1, . . . , αn−1 ∈ R ∪ {−∞,+∞}, β ∈ [0, 1], for ∀D1, . . . , Dn,
pi(D1, . . . , Dn) = med(y
∗
1 , . . . , y
∗
n, α1, . . . , αn−1)
where y∗i = βy
0
i + (1− β)y
1
i with [y
0
i , y
1
i ] = med(Di), for i = 1, . . . , n.
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Proof. LetDi be any reported locations controlled by agent i with [y
0
i , y
1
i ] = med(Di) for i ∈ [n]. For any
agent i and any coalition S of agents including i, denote their real locations by DS = {Dj}j∈S , and the
reported locations of other agents byD−S . W.l.o.g. assume y
1
i < pi(DS , D−S).
Consider any misreport by the coalitionD′S = {D
′
j}j∈S that satisfies
l(pi(D′S , D−S), Di) < l(pi(DS , D−S), Di).
Then pi(D′S , D−S) < pi(DS , D−S). This means there exists some j ∈ S such that y
1
j ≥ pi(DS , D−S),
while after misreporting D′j 6= Dj , some value y
′
j ∈ med(D
′
j) satisfies y
′
j < pi(DS , D−S). Then for
agent j, if y0j ≤ pi(DS , D−S), her loss cannot be smaller after such a misreport since her loss is minimized
originally. If y0j > pi(DS , D−S), then after such a misreport she obtains a bigger loss. Thus, at least agent j
in the coalition is not strictly better off, which completes the proof for group strategyproofness.
However, when some agent have multiple optimal locations, i.e. some agent i’s real locationsDi satisfies
med(Di) = [y
0
i , y
1
i ] and y
0
i < y
1
i , then most strategyproofmechanism satisfying Eqn. (6) is not strong group
strategyproof. Here is a counter example.
Example 5.1. Let n = 3. For any anonymous, efficient and strategyproof mechanism pi(D1, D2, D3), let
α1 ≤ α2 be the corresponding constants.
If α1 < α2, let α1 < y
0
1 < y
1
1 < α2, D1 = {y
0
i , y
1
i }, D2 = {y
0
i }, and D3 = {y
1
i } as the real
controlled locations of agent 1, 2, 3 respectively. Then pi(D1, D2, D3) = y
∗
1 , the value choosing from the
interval [y0i , y
1
i ]. If y
∗
1 = y
0
1 , then agent 1 can misreport D
′
1 = {y
1
1 , y
1
1}, resulting in pi(D1, D2, D3) = y
1
1
which is better for agent 3 and not worse for agent 1 herself. Otherwise, y01 < y
∗
1 ≤ y
1
1, then agent 1 can
misreport D′1 = {y
0
1 , y
0
1}, resulting in pi(D1, D2, D3) = y
0
1 which is better for agent 2 and not worse for
agent 1 herself.
If α1 = α2 /∈ {−∞,+∞}, let y0i < α1 = α2 < y
1
i and D1 = {y
0
i , y
1
i }. Similarly if y
∗
1 = y
0
1 , when
D2 = {y1i }, and D3 = {y
1
i }, agent 1 truthfully reporting D1 results in pi(D1, D2, D3) = α1. But agent 1
can misreport D′1 = {y
1
1, y
1
1}, resulting in pi(D1, D2, D3) = y
1
1 which is better for agent 2 and 3, and not
worse for agent 1. If y∗1 is chosen as any value satisfies y
0
1 < y
∗
1 ≤ y
1
1 , when D2 = {y
0
i }, and D3 = {y
0
i },
agent 1 truthfully reporting D1 results in pi(D1, D2, D3) = y
∗
1 . But agent 1 can misreport D
′
1 = {y
0
1 , y
0
1},
resulting in pi(D1, D2, D3) = y
0
1 which is better for agent 2 and 3, and not worse for agent 1.
If each agent is further assumed to have unique optimal location, then strategyproof mechanisms are also
strong group strategyproof, the proof of which is similar as Theorem 5.1.
Theorem 5.2. For facility location problems where each agent controls multiple locations and has an unique
optimal location, a mechanism pi is anonymous, efficient and strong group strategyproof w.r.t. manipulation,
replication, and hiding, if there exist α1, . . . , αn−1 ∈ R ∪ {−∞,+∞}, for ∀D1, . . . , Dn,
pi(D1, . . . , Dn) = med(y
∗
1 , . . . , y
∗
n, α1, . . . , αn−1)
where y∗i = med(Di),i = 1, . . . , n.
6 Future Directions
We considered richer strategic behavior of agents in facility location problems where each agent controls
multiple locations. Facility location problems can be viewed as a single-dimension special case of the strate-
gic linear regression problem, initially introduced by Dekel et al. [2010]. Prior work by Dekel et al. [2010]
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and Chen et al. [2018] have studied linear regression that are strategyproof w.r.t. manipulation. However,
the regression mechanism proposed in Dekel et al. [2010] is not strategyproof w.r.t. replication. And the
GRH mechanisms studied by Chen et al. [2018], are not strategyproof w.r.t. to hiding. It will be interesting
to characterize strategyproof linear regression under richer strategic considerations, especially because in
practice commercial data sources often find it beneficial to replicate or hide part of their data.
On the other hand, Section 4.1 showed that the family of anonymous, efficient and strategyproof mech-
anisms remains the same even if only manipulation is considered, when agents control the same number of
locations. This is somewhat surprising because one may expect that the richer the strategic consideration
the smaller the set of strategyproof mechanisms. It will be interesting to fully characterize the family of
strategyproof mechanisms w.r.t. manipulation only, with the assumption that each agent controls the same
number of locations dropped.
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A Proof of Theorem 4.2
Let m ≥ 1 be the number of locations each agent controls, i.e. m = |Di|, ∀i. The proof is separated into
two parts due to the different properties of the median operation when m is an odd number and when m is
an even number.
Lemma A.1. For facility location problems where each agent controls multiple locations, if a mechanism pi
is anonymous and strategyproof w.r.t. manipulation, then for each i ∈ [n],D−i,
• ifm is an odd number, for each y∗i ∈ R, there exist si, hi ∈ R such that si < y
∗
i < hi or si = hi and
pi(Di, D−i) =


si if l(si, Di) < l(hi, Di);
hi if l(si, Di) > l(hi, Di);
si or hi otherwise
(7)
for all Di with y
∗
i = med(Di);
• ifm is an even number, for each y0i ≤ y
1
i ∈ R, there exist si, hi ∈ R such that si < y
0
i ≤ y
1
i < hi or
si = hi, and either pi(D) ∈ [y
0
i , y
1
i ] or
pi(Di, D−i) =


si if l(si, Di) < l(hi, Di);
hi if l(si, Di) > l(hi, Di);
si or hi otherwise
(8)
for all Di with [y
0
i , y
1
i ] = med(Di).
Proof. If a mechanism outputs the optimal location based an agent’s reported locations or a constant loca-
tion, the agent has no incentive to misreport. Thus, we try to characterize a strategyproofmechanism beyond
these two trivial types.
First for the case that m is an odd number, each agent i has an unique optimal location, denoted by y∗i .
We focus on all Di with y
∗
i = med(Di), which are possible misreports from the agent who manipulate its
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private locations. For any fixed D−i, suppose there are at least three different outputs pi({D′i, D−i}) for
all such D′i, w.l.o.g. let pi({D
1
i , D−i}) < pi({D
2
i , D−i}) < pi({D
3
i , D−i}). If y
∗
i ≤ pi({D
2
i , D−i}), then
when other agents reportD−i, agent i whose real controlled locations D¯i = D
3
i will misreportD
2
i to obtain
a smaller loss. Otherwise, y∗i > pi({D
2
i , D−i}), then when other agents report D−i, agent i whose real
controlled locations D¯i = D
1
i will misreport D
2
i to obtain a smaller loss. This is a contradiction, which
means there are at most two different outputs for all such Di, denoted by si < hi. Let pi({D1i , D−i}) = si
and pi({D2i , D−i}) = hi. (Here we ignore the case si = hi corresponding to a constant output.) If y
∗
i ≤
si, when other agents report D−i, agent i whose real controlled locations D¯i = D
2
i will misreport D
1
i .
Similarly, if y∗i ≥ hi, when other agents report D−i, agent i whose real controlled locations D¯i = D
1
i will
misreportD2i . Thus, we know si < y
∗
i < hi, and Eqn. (7) is straightforward. Finally, the case thatm is an
even number can be analyzed similarly.
In the next two lemma, corresponding tom is odd and even, we formally prove the case si 6= hi in Eqn.
(7) and Eqn. (8) will not happen if the mechanism is also efficient.
Lemma A.2. For facility location problems where each agent controls multiple locations, if a mechanism pi
is anonymous, efficient and strategyproof w.r.t. manipulation, andm is an odd number, then for any i ∈ [n],
D−i, y
∗
i ∈ R, there do not exist si, hi ∈ R such that si < y
∗
i < hi, and pi satisfies Eqn. (7) for all Di with
y∗i = med(Di).
Proof. If n = 1, an efficient mechanism should always output the median of the reported locations.
For n = 2, w.o.l.g, assume there exists some D2 with median denoted by y
∗
2 , y
∗
1 , and s1 < y
∗
1 < h1,
such that pi satisfies Eqn. (7) for all D1 with y
∗
1 = med(D1). This means there exist at least two special
location sets D11 and D
2
1 such that pi(D
1
1 , D2) = s1 and pi(D
2
1 , D2) = h1 (for example D
1
1 = {s1, y
∗
1 , y
∗
1}
andD21 = {y
∗
1 , y
∗
1 , h1}). If y
∗
2 ≥ y
∗
1 , then pi(D
1
1 , D2) = s1 is not efficient since at least y
∗
1 is a better output
for both agent 1 and 2. Similarly, if y∗2 < y
∗
1 , then pi(D
2
1 , D2) = h1 is not efficient since at least y
∗
1 is a
better output for both agent 1 and 2. It is a contradiction, so the result holds for n = 2.
For n ≥ 3, assume there exist some i, D−i, y∗i , and si < y
∗
i < hi, such that pi satisfies Eqn. (7) for
all Di with y
∗
i = med(Di). Consider three special location sets D
1
i , D
2
i , D
3
i satisfying pi(D
1
i , D−i) = si,
pi(D2i , D−i) = hi, and l(si, D
3
i ) = l(hi, D
3
i ). For example,D
1
i = {si, y
∗
i , y
∗
i },D
2
i = {y
∗
i , y
∗
i , hi} and
D3i =


{si, y
∗
i ,
1
2
(3hi + si)− y
∗
i } if y
∗
i ≥
1
2
(hi + si);
{
1
2
(hi + 3si)− y
∗
i , y
∗
i , hi} if y
∗
i <
1
2
(hi + si).
W.l.o.g., we assume pi(D3i , D−i) = hi. Define an index set I = {j|y
∗
j = med(Dj), y
∗
j ≤ si}. By definition
and the efficiency condition, we know 1 ≤ |I| ≤ n−1. In the following proof, we shall derive contradictions
for |I| = 1, . . . , n− 1 by induction, thus the result holds for any n ≥ 3.
If |I| = 1, that is there is only one j ∈ [n], such that y∗j = med(Dj) and y
∗
j ≤ si. DenoteD−i,−j as the
reported location sets by agents other than agent i and j, then we rewrite the fact that pi(D1i , Dj, D−i,−j) =
si and pi(D
2
i , Dj , D−i,−j) = hi. Consider agent j’s another possible report D
′
j = D
1
i . Due to the ef-
ficiency, we know pi(D1i , D
′
j , D−i,−j) > si ≥ y
∗
j . If pi(D
2
i , D
′
j , D−i,−j) < hi, then when agent i re-
ports D2i and other agents report D−i,−j , agent j with real locations D¯j = Dj will misreport D
′
j to ob-
tain a smaller loss. If pi(D2i , D
′
j , D−i,−j) > hi, then when agent i reports D
2
i and other agents report
D−i,−j , agent j with real locations are D¯j = D
′
j will misreport Dj to obtain a smaller loss. This means
pi(D2i , D
′
j, D−i,−j) = hi. Now for fixed D
′
j , D−i,−j , if there exists s
′
i < y
∗
i such that for some D
′
i with
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y∗i = med(D
′
i), pi(D
′
i, D
′
j , D−i,−j) = s
′
i, then pi(D
′
i, D
′
j , D−i,−j) is not efficient. This means for all D
′
i
with y∗i = med(D
′
i), pi(D
′
i, D
′
j , D−i,−j) = hi. Specifically, pi(D
1
i , D
′
j , D−i,−j) = hi. However, when
agent j reports D′j and other agents report D−i,−j , agent i with real locations are D
1
i will misreport Dj ,
which leads to pi(Dj , D
′
j , D−i,−j) = pi(Dj , D
1
i , D−i,−j) = si by the anonymity, to obtain a smaller loss.
This is a contradiction, meaning it is impossible that |I| = 1.
Now suppose we have proved it is impossible that |I| = 1, . . . , t for some t ≥ 1, we consider the
case |I| = t + 1. Let jˆ = argminj∈I{y∗j |y
∗
j = med(Dj)}, then ∀j ∈ [n], y
∗
j = med(Dj) ≥ y
∗
jˆ
. Sim-
ilarly, denote D−i,−jˆ as the reported location sets by agents other than agent i and jˆ, and we rewrite the
fact that pi(D1i , Djˆ , D−i,−jˆ) = si and pi(D
2
i , Djˆ , D−i,−jˆ) = hi. Consider agent jˆ’s another possible re-
port D′
jˆ
= D1i . Due to the efficiency, we know pi(D
1
i , D
′
jˆ
, D−i,−j) ≥ y∗jˆ . If pi(D
2
i , D
′
jˆ
, D−i,−jˆ) < hi,
then when agent i reports D2i and other agents report D−i,−jˆ , agent jˆ with real locations D¯jˆ = Djˆ
will misreport D′
jˆ
to obtain a smaller loss. If pi(D2i , D
′
jˆ
, D−i,−jˆ) > hi, then when agent i reports D
2
i
and other agents report D−i,−jˆ , agent j with real locations D¯jˆ = D
′
jˆ
will misreport Djˆ to obtain a
smaller loss. This means pi(D2i , D
′
jˆ
, D−i,−jˆ) = hi. Now for fixed D
′
jˆ
, D−i,−jˆ , if for all D
′
i with y
∗
i =
med(D′i), pi(D
′
i, D
′
jˆ
, D−i,−jˆ) = hi, specifically we have pi(D
1
i , D
′
jˆ
, D−i,−jˆ) = hi. However, when agent
jˆ reports D′
jˆ
and other agents report D−i,−jˆ , agent i with real locations D¯i = D
1
i will misreport Djˆ ,
which leads to pi(Djˆ , D
′
jˆ
, D−i,−jˆ) = pi(Djˆ , D
1
i , D−i,−jˆ) = si by the anonymity, to obtain a smaller loss.
This is a contradiction, meaning there must exist s′i < y
∗
i such that for some D
′
i with y
∗
i = med(D
′
i),
pi(D′i, D
′
jˆ
, D−i,−jˆ) = s
′
i. If s
′
i < si, then y
∗
jˆ
≤ s′i < si, while pi(D
′
i, Djˆ, D−i,−jˆ) ≥ si since it
equals either si or hi. This means when agent i reports D
′
i and other agents report D−i,−jˆ , agent jˆ with
real locations D¯jˆ = Djˆ will misreport D
′
jˆ
to obtain smaller loss. If s′i > si, for the special location
set D3i , we have l(s
′
i, D
3
i ) < l(si, D
3
i ) = l(hi, D
3
i ). Thus, pi(D
3
i , D
′
jˆ
, D−i,−jˆ) = s
′
i, while originally
pi(D3i , Djˆ, D−i,−jˆ) = hi.
1 This means when agent i reports D3i and other agents report D−i,−jˆ , agent j
with real location D¯jˆ = Djˆ will misreportD
′
jˆ
to obtain smaller loss. Thus, we must have s′i = si. In other
words, when other agents’ reports change toD′
jˆ
, D−i,−jˆ , pi still satisfies Eqn. (7) with the same si, hi as they
reportDjˆ , D−i,−jˆ , while the corresponding |I| = t since med(D
′
jˆ
) = y∗i > si. However, we have already
proved that it is impossible for |I| = t. By induction, we provide contradictions for |I| = 1, . . . , n− 1, and
this completes the proof for n ≥ 3.
Lemma A.3. For facility location problems where each agent control multiple locations, if a mechanism pi
is anonymous, efficient and strategyproof w.r.t. manipulation, andm is an even number, then for any i ∈ [n],
D−i, y
0
i ≤ y
1
i ∈ R, there do not exist si, hi ∈ R such that si < y
0
i ≤ y
1
i < hi, and pi satisfies Eqn. (8) for
allDi with [y
0
i , y
1
i ] = med(Di).
The proof of Lemma A.3 makes use of Lemma A.4.
Lemma A.4. For facility location problems where each agent controls multiple locations, suppose a mech-
anism pi is anonymous, efficient and strategyproof w.r.t. manipulation, and m is an even number. If there
exist some i ∈ [n], D−i, y0i ≤ y
1
i ∈ R, si, hi ∈ R such that si < y
0
i ≤ y
1
i < hi, and pi satisfies Eqn. (8)
1Note that if we assume pi(D3i ,D−i) = si, the proofs for n ≥ 3 shall be done by an induction on the opposite index set
I′ = {j|y∗
j
= med(Dj), y∗j ≥ hi}.
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for all Di with [y
0
i , y
1
i ] = med(Di), denote two index sets I1 = {j|[y
0
j , y
1
j ] = med(Dj), y
0
j ≤ si, y
1
j < hi}
and I2 = {j|[y0j , y
1
j ] = med(Dj), y
1
j ≥ hi, y
0
j > si}, then I1 = ∅, I2 = ∅.
Proof of Lemma A.4. If n = 1, an efficient mechanism should always output the median of the reported
locations.
For n = 2, w.o.l.g, assume there exists some D2 with median denoted by [y
0
2 , y
1
2 ], y
0
1 , y
1
1 , and s1 <
y01 ≤ y
1
1 < h1, such that pi satisfies Eqn. (8) for all D1 with [y
0
1 , y
1
1 ] = med(D1). This means there
exist at least two special location sets D11 and D
2
1 such that pi(D
1
1, D2) = s1 and pi(D
2
1 , D2) = h1 (for
example D11 = {s1, y
0
1 , y
1
1 , y
1
1} and D
2
1 = {y
0
1 , y
0
1 , y
1
1, h1}). If I1| 6= ∅, that is y
0
2 ≤ si and y
1
2 < hi, then
pi(D21 , D2) = h1 is not efficient since any location between y
0
1 and y
1
1 is a better output for both agent 1 and
2. If I2 6= ∅, that is y
1
2 ≥ hi and y
0
2 > si, then pi(D
1
1 , D2) = s1 is not efficient since any location between
y01 and y
1
1 is a better output for both agent 1 and 2. Thus, the result holds for n = 2.
For n ≥ 3, assume there exist some i, D−i, y0i ≤ y
1
i , and si < y
0
i ≤ y
1
i < hi, such that pi satisfies Eqn.
(8) for allDi with [y
0
i , y
1
i ] = med(Di). Consider two special location setsD
1
i , D
2
i satisfying pi(D
1
i , D−i) =
si, pi(D
2
i , D−i) = hi. In the following proof, we shall derive contradictions for |I1| = 1, . . . , n − 1 by
induction, and the corresponding analysis for I2 is similar.
If |I1| = 1, that is there is only one j ∈ [n], such that [y0j , y
1
j ] = med(Dj), y
0
j ≤ si and y
1
j < hi.
Denote D−i,−j as the reported location sets by agents other than agent i and j, then we rewrite the fact
that pi(D1i , Dj, D−i,−j) = si and pi(D
2
i , Dj , D−i,−j) = hi. Consider agent j’s another possible report
D′j = D
1
i . Due to the efficiency, we know pi(D
1
i , D
′
j , D−i,−j) > si ≥ y
0
j . If pi(D
2
i , D
′
j , D−i,−j) > hi, then
when agent i reportsD2i and other agents reportD−i,−j , agent j with real locations D¯j = D
′
j will misreport
Dj to obtain a smaller loss. If pi(D
2
i , D
′
j, D−i,−j) < hi, then when agent i reports D
2
i and other agents
reportD−i,−j , agent j with real locations D¯j = Dj will misreportD
′
j to obtain a smaller loss. This means
pi(D2i , D
′
j, D−i,−j) = hi. Now for fixed D
′
j , D−i,−j , suppose there exists s
′
i < y
0
i such that for some D
′
i
with [y0i , y
1
i ] = med(D
′
i), pi(D
′
i, D
′
j , D−i,−j) = s
′
i. Let s
∗ = mink∈[n]{y
0
k|[y
0
k, y
1
k] = med(Dk), si < y
0
k ≤
y1k < hi}, and k denote the corresponding agent with y
0
k = s
∗. Due to the efficiency we must have s′i ≥ s
∗
, which means there exists k 6= i satisfying y0k ≤ s
′
i, y
1
k < hi. This means we can repeat previous process
w.r.t. Dk and new [s
′
i, hi] (for at most n − 2 times since k 6= i and k 6= j) until no such k. We reuse the
notation D′−i after this process (either with the repeated part or not) as the reports of agents other than i,
and we have for all Di with [y
0
i , y
1
i ] = med(Di), pi(Di, D
′
−i) = hi. Specifically, pi(D
1
i , D
′
j, D−i,−j) = hi.
(If the repeated process happens, we only need to replace j and D1i by the lass k and D
′
i in the process.)
However, when agent j reportsD′j and other agents reportD−i,−j , agent i with real locations D¯i = D
1
i will
misreport Dj , which leads to pi(Dj , D
′
j, D−i,−j) = pi(Dj , D
1
i , D−i,−j) = pi(D
1
i , Dj, D−i,−j) = si by its
symmetry, to obtain a smaller loss. This is a contradiction, meaning it is impossible that |I| = 1.
Now suppose we have proved it is impossible that |I| = 1, . . . , t for some t ≥ 1, we consider the case
|I| = t + 1. Let jˆ = argminj∈I1{y
0
j |[y
0
j , y
1
j ] = med(Dj)}. Similarly, denote D−i,−jˆ as the reported
location sets by agents other than agent i and jˆ, and we rewrite the fact that pi(D1i , Djˆ, D−i,−jˆ) = si and
pi(D2i , Djˆ, D−i,−jˆ) = hi. Consider agent jˆ’s another possible report D
′
jˆ
= D1i . If pi(D
1
i , D
′
jˆ
, D−i,−j) <
y0
jˆ
, it is not efficient since at least y0
jˆ
is a better output for all agents j ∈ I1 as well as agent i and not
worse for other agents. If pi(D2i , D
′
jˆ
, D−i,−jˆ) > hi, then when agent i reports D
2
i and other agents
report D−i,−jˆ , agent j with real locations D¯jˆ = D
′
jˆ
will misreport Djˆ to obtain a smaller loss. If
y0
jˆ
≤ pi(D2i , D
′
jˆ
, D−i,−jˆ) < hi, then when agent i reportsD
2
i and other agents reportD−i,−jˆ , agent jˆ with
real locations D¯jˆ = Djˆ will misreport D
′
jˆ
to obtain a smaller loss. This means pi(D2i , D
′
jˆ
, D−i,−jˆ) = hi.
Now for fixedD′
jˆ
, D−i,−jˆ , if for all Di with [y
0
i , y
1
i ] = med(Di), pi(Di, D
′
jˆ
, D−i,−jˆ) = hi, specifically we
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have pi(D1i , D
′
jˆ
, D−i,−jˆ) = hi. Then when agent jˆ reportsD
′
jˆ
and other agents reportD−i,−jˆ , agent i with
real locations D¯i = D
1
i will misreport Djˆ , which leads to pi(Djˆ , D
′
jˆ
, D−i,−jˆ) = pi(Djˆ , D
1
i , D−i,−jˆ) = si
by its symmetry, to obtain a smaller loss. This is a contradiction, meaning there must exist s′i < y
0
i such
that for some D′i with [y
0
i , y
1
i ] = med(D
′
i), pi(D
′
i, D
′
jˆ
, D−i,−jˆ) = s
′
i. In other words, when other agents’
reports change toD′
jˆ
, D−i,−jˆ , there still exist s
′
i, h
′
i, such that s
′
i < y
0
i ≤ y
1
i < h
′
i = hi and pi satisfies Eqn.
(7) for all Di satisfying that |Di| is an even number and [y0i , y
1
i ] = med(Di). And for the corresponding
index set I ′1 = {j|[y
0
j , y
1
j ] = med(Dj), y
0
j ≤ s
′
i, y
1
j < hi} (after replacingDjˆ byD
′
jˆ
), we have jˆ /∈ I ′1 since
med(D′
jˆ
) = [y0i , y
1
i ]. Finally, if |I
′
1| > t, we can repeatedly replace the report of the agent whose location
set has the leftmost median among those agents in I ′1 in the same way until |I
′
1| ≤ t, and the same analysis
still holds. Since such an index set satisfies |I ′1| ≤ n− 1, after at most n− t− 1 times of such replacing, we
must have |I ′1| = t. However, we have already proved that it is impossible for |I1| = t. By induction, we
provide contradictions for |I| = 1, . . . , n− 1, and this completes the proof for n ≥ 3.
Proof of Lemma A.3. Assume there exist some i, D−i, y
0
i ≤ y
1
i , and si < y
0
i ≤ y
1
i < hi, such that pi
satisfies Eqn. (8) for all Di satisfying that |Di| is an even number and [y
0
i , y
1
i ] = med(Di). According
to Lemma A.4, we know for any j ∈ [n], let [y0j , y
1
j ] = med(Dj), then either y
0
j ≤ si < hi ≤ y
1
j , or
si < y
0
j ≤ y
1
j < hi. Let I = {j|[y
0
j , y
1
j ] = med(Dj), si < y
0
j ≤ y
1
j < hi}, I 6= ∅ since there exist at least
one j = i ∈ I. Let s∗ = minj∈I{y0j |[y
0
j , y
1
j ] = med(Dj)}. Then for any Di that pi(Di, D−i) = si is not
efficient since s∗ is a better output for all agent j ∈ I while not worse for other agent. This is a contradiction
to the efficiency condition and completes the proof.
Lemma A.2 and A.3 mean any mechanism pi which is efficient and strategyproof only depends on y∗i =
med(Di) for i ∈ [n]. In other words, agents only need to report their most preferred locations, i.e. med(Di)
for i ∈ [n], which completes the proof of Theorem 4.2.
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